We present new evidence on the influence of income inequality on generalized trust. Using individual panel data from Swedish counties together with an instrumental variable strategy we find that differences in disposable income, and especially differences among people in the bottom half of the income distribution, are associated with lower trust. The relationship between income inequality and trust is particularly strong for people with a strong aversion against income differentials. We also find that the proportion of people born in a foreign country is negatively associated with trust.
Introduction
Differences between people seem to generate distrust. A number of empirical studies have established that income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity display a strong, negative correlation with the extent to which people trust each other (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Glaeser et al., 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Uslaner, 2002 Uslaner, , 2003 Knack and Zak, 2003) . Although these relationships are well-established, any casual interpretation must be seen as tenuous. On the theoretical side, little is known about the social mechanisms that are supposed to be at work. On the empirical side, the present evidence is entirely based on cross-sectional data without any variation in the way that income inequality is defined or measured. The lack of credible strategies for empirical identification renders causal interpretations difficult.
An influential theoretical model can be found in Zak and Knack (2001) , where trust between investors and brokers falls with the distance between them. Distance is greater for people who are "dissimilar" in the sense of being genetically or socially far from each other. 1 They derive the proposition that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of wages will reduce trust. Like some other studies their empirical investigation shows that trust is lower in countries where the Gini coefficient indicates a more unequal distribution of income. But according to their model, this relationship is not an effect of inequality as such. It arises as a net wage effect due to the supposition that people are more sensitive to income changes at lower wages. When studying individual level data, one should not expect to find this effect of income inequality if individual wages are controlled for. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) study individual level data from US localities and find that trust is lower among people who live in a racially mixed community or in a community with a high degree of income inequality. Within racially mixed communities it is especially people who express strong feelings against racial integration who are less trusting. The results are interpreted as a genuine "aversion to heterogeneity", rather than as an effect of "local interaction" due to the fact that both blacks and the poor are less trusting. 2 1 For the genetic part, Zak and Knack (2001:299) invoke Hamilton's Rule from evolutionary biology, "which specifies the level of altruistic behaviour among family members (and, with in-breeding, neighbours) that maximizes the survival of one's genes, including those shared among relatives." 2 A somewhat related literature links income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity to participation in associational activities (like religious groups, sport groups etc). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find that such participation is lower in localities with a more unequal income distribution and with higher racial or ethnic fragmentation. This is consistent with their theoretical model of group formation, especially if mixed groups are present. La notes that the effect of inequality on participation can depend both on the access rule for group membership and on the part of the wealth distribution where the action is. Interesting as this may be, it is far In view of the rather uncertain state of knowledge we choose a broad and somewhat explorative empirical strategy. When our understanding is vague and imprecise, trying different alternatives can prove fruitful. To get a dataset suitable for this undertaking, we combine panel data on trust from the Swedish Election Studies with register based income measures from the longitudinal data base LINDA. In addition to having access to panel data and high quality measures of individual income, we also improve upon the existing empirical literature by taking opinions on income inequality into account and by tackling the problem of causality by using international demand as an instrument for income inequality.
Looking at different definitions of both income and inequality we find that inequalities in disposable (rather than gross) income are negatively related to trust, and that differences among people in the bottom half of the income distribution appear to have a particularly strong effect on trust. These results are reinforced by our use of international demand as an exogenous source of identifying variation.
Inspired by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) , who take feelings against racial integration into account, we recognize that people also have very different opinions on income inequality, and that such differences may mean that, within a given distribution of income, some people will be more trusting than others. Our results confirm that when it comes to trusting people in general, people with a strong aversion against income differences are much more sensitive to income inequality. This result is hardly surprising, but it could be of great importance when interpreting findings both from cross country studies and from studies of single countries.
Like Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) we also find the proportion foreign born within a region to be negatively associated with trust.
There are good reasons to care about trust. The advantages of living in a trusting society are countless and most valuable. Of particular economic significance is the finding that trust promotes economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack 2001) . Understanding the determinants of growth is of obvious importance. As a concrete example, underscoring the relevance of our study, trust may be a missing link in the literature that connects economic inequality and growth (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Aghion et al., 1999) .
from clear that associational activities generate trust (as Putnam, 1993, argues) . There are a large number of studies that tests for but do not find such a link (see e.g. Claiborn and Martin, 2000; Wollebaek and Selle, 2002; Delhey and Newton, 2003; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003) .
Data and Empirical Strategy
We use individual level data on trust from the 1994 and 1998 Swedish Election Studies. The election studies are made in the form of a two-step panel in which each respondent is interviewed twice and one half of them are replaced in each study. Each respondent's trust in "people in general" is measured on a discrete scale ranging from 0 to 10. Note: For each county we first take the average across respondents in 1994 and in 1998. Then, for each county, we take the average over those two averages. To calculate various measures of county specific income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity we use the register-based longitudinal database LINDA, constructed to be cross-sectionally representative of the Swedish population. 5 The dataset is large; each year it contains 3.35 percent of the Swedish population corresponding to over 300,000 individuals.
An attractive feature of the database is that attrition from the sample is only due to death or to emigration. Information about individuals' incomes comes from tax reports, so the income variable is free from the measurement errors that are common in survey data such as recall errors, rounding errors, and top-coding. 6 Our calculations are based on people who are between 20 and 64 years old, and who are not students.
Though Sweden is a country with fairly low levels of income inequality, there are distinct differences across counties. Since we will employ county or individual fixed effects in the estimations, it is informative to have a closer look at changes in inequality across counties. Blekinge, for instance, has a substantial increase in the 90/10-quotient but a small decrease in the Gini coefficient. Since the Gini coefficient is most sensitive to income differences around the middle (or more precisely, the mode) of the income distribution, this implies that the gap between those with low (10 th percentile) and high incomes (90 th percentile) has increased markedly in Blekinge, whereas slightly negative changes in inequality have occurred between the income levels where the majority of the population are located. For Sweden as a whole (the last bar) there is a small increase in the 90/10-quoitient but no change in the Gini coefficient.
5 The registers are maintained by Statistics Sweden; see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for details. 6 The individual income variable from the Swedish Election Studies that we use in our regressions is also register based. It should be noted that mean income is about the same in the Swedish Election Studies and in LINDA, our two main data sources. In LINDA (the much larger data base) mean income is 3 percent higher in 1994 and 2 percent higher in 1998 compared to the Swedish Election Studies. G o t l a n d s B l e k i n g e S k å n e H a l l a n d V ä s t r a G ö t a l a n d V ä r m l a n d Ö r e b r o V ä s t m a n l a n d K o p p a r b e r g G ä v l e b o r g V ä s t e r n o r r l a n d J ä m t l a n d S ö d e r m a n l a n d Ö s t e r g ö t l a n d J ö n k ö p i n g K r o n o b e r g K a l m a r G o t l a n d s B l e k i n g e S k å n e H a l l a n d V ä s t r a G ö t a l a n d V ä r m l a n d Ö r e b r o V ä s t m a n l a n d K o p p a r b e r g G ä v l e b o r g V ä s t e r n o r r l a n d J ä m t l a n d V ä s t e r b o t t e n N o r r b o t t e n S w e d e n
Gini
Note: We calculate the 90/10-quiotient for each county in 1994 and 1998, and then take the mean over these two years. G o t l a n d s B l e k i n g e S k å n e H a l l a n d V ä s t r a G ö t a l a n d V ä r m l a n d Ö r e b r o V ä s t m a n l a n d K o p p a r b e r g G ä v l e b o r g V ä s t e r n o r r l a n d J ä m t l a n d V ä s t e r b o t t e n N o r r b o t t e n S w e d e n
Percentage change
Gini 90/10-quotient By looking at different measures of income and income inequality we hope to extend the existing literature. In view of the tentative and uncertain causal mechanisms, findings from an exploratory empirical investigation could be of considerable value. We consider the following measures of inequality (calculations are based on data from LINDA):
• Gini, a measure that is sensitive to changes at the mode of the income distribution;
• P90-10, a measure of the ratio of high to low income earners (the 90 th to the 10 th percentile) that is not sensitive to extreme values at the tails of the income distribution; • P90-50 and P50-10, to look at changes in the upper and lower parts of the income distribution.
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Using data from LINDA we also work with two measures of ethnic heterogeneity; the proportion of people who are born in a foreign country (Proportion Foreign), and an index of ethnic fragmentation (Ethnic Index). The index, which increases in heterogeneity, is defined as: Our regressions include control variables that are related to trust according to previous studies. Income (measured in 100,000 SEK) and Schooling raise trust according to Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) , and a number of cross-country studies (e.g. Zak and Knack, 2001) . In their theoretical model, Zak and Knack (2001) give an explanation that is based on the opportunity cost of working. For someone who earns a lot of money it is more attractive to work and trust than to spend time verifying the actions of others. The relationship between education and trust could be a causal one of learning or socialization, or it could be that education proxies wages and discount rates that affect trust. 8 Age is also controlled for since Putnam (2000) and others have found that old people tend to be more trusting than young ones. However, working with Swedish data, we also note that Stolle (2002, 2003) Population, and the number of reported crimes per 100 inhabitants in each county (Crime), as well as county and year dummies. 9 In Appendix A we report definitions, summary statistics, and sources for the variables that are used throughout this paper.
In the main text we report estimates from linear regressions on our cross-sectional and panel sample. In Appendix B we report estimates from an ordered logit and from the fixed effecs ordered logit developed in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) 
Results

Individual Determinants of Trust
We first investigate how individual characteristics are related to trust. 10 We only include individuals who do not move to another county in our panel sample. Apart from possibly being determined endogenously, moving often changes the observed income inequality quite dramatically (for the individual); and at the same time, it can have a direct effect on trust. There are only 23 movers in our panel sample and they actually appear to be about as trusting as others. Results from linear regressions on Trust, ranging from 0 to 10. Standard errors clustered on counties in parentheses. Results with individual fixed effects are based on 340 individuals who are observed in both 1994 and 1998 and who lived in the same county during these two years. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Income Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity
Next we investigate if different measures of income inequality produce different results. As can be seen in Table 2 , no measure of inequality based on gross income attains standard levels of statistical significance, except the 50/10-quotient which is significant at the 10 percent level. The same results hold true for a measure of gross income that includes capital income.
For disposable income, the 90/10-quiotent displays a negative and statistically significant relationship with Trust at the ten percent level. This seems to be driven by inequality in the lower half of the distribution as the 90/50-quotient is positive and statistically insignificant whereas the 50/10-quotient is negative and statistically significant at the five percent level. Interestingly, including both the 90/50-and the 50/10-quotient results in very similar estimates as when these measures are included separately.
Changes in the 50/10-quotient can have a substantial impact on Trust. According to the estimates for disposable income, Trust is predicted to decrease by 1.4 units on its 0−10 scale if P50-10 would increase from its mean of 1.82 to its maximum of 2.05 (in Stockholm).
When we use gross income the impact of P50-10 is less than half as large. For the Gini coefficient the impact is much smaller; here an increase from mean to max would reduce Trust with 0.5 units, when we use disposable income. Using gross income doubles the impact of Gini, but it is still markedly lower than that of P50-10.
The results in Table 2 indicate that it is inequality in disposable income that matters the most, suggesting an importance of inequality in consumption opportunities rather than in earnings capacity. It also means that trust could be influenced by means of income redistribution. Not all kind of inequality in disposable income matters though; it is primarily differences between those with low income versus those with median income that affect trust.
The Gini coefficient, the measure used exclusively in previous studies, is more weakly related to Trust in our sample.
Having investigated different measures of income inequality we turn to another kind of dissimilarity: ethnic heterogeneity. Previous studies that describe ethnic heterogeneity as a strong determinant of trust have already been mentioned. Note that ethnic heterogeneity is positively correlated with income inequality. In our sample P50-10 has a correlation of 0.80
with Proportion Foreign and a correlation of 0.87 with Ethnic Index. Results from linear regressions on Trust, ranging from 0 to 10. Standard errors clustered on counties in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. would reduce Trust by about 2.5 units on its 0−10 scale. The same increase in Ethnic Index would only produce a reduction half as big. When we include Proportion Foreign P90-10 is no longer statistically significant, whereas P50-10 retains statistical significance if only at the ten percent level. The sizes of the cross-sectional inequality coefficients are very similar to the estimates in Table 2. 14 The fact that the estimated coefficients in the panel sample are of the expected signs and do not change much when we include individual fixed effects suggests that unobservable individual characteristics do not bias the cross-sectional estimates.
The Heterogeneity of Trust Formation
Are the trust reducing effects of income inequality and Proportion Foreign stronger for certain people? Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find an increase in racial heterogeneity to be more trust reducing for people with aversion against inter-racial contacts. Here we ask whether individuals with aversion against inequality are affected differently by increases in income dispersion.
The analysis is based on a question in the Swedish Election Studies were each respondent were asked their opinion on income inequality. The answers were given on a 1 to 5 scale, with 1 denoting strong aversion against inequality. In the panel sample, we use aversion against income inequality expressed in 1994 to avoid that attitudes are influenced by income changes between 1994 and 1998. We have tried dividing the 1 to 5 scale in various ways and the striking pattern, reported in Table B1 in Appendix B contains corresponding ordered logit estimates. They are fully in line with the estimates in Table 3 . 15 We have also investigated if the effects under study are different for people who are negative to a "multicultural society". People who are not sympathetic to such a society do not seem to react much to income inequality, instead the estimated effect of Proportion Foreign is strong and statistically significant at the ten percent level in all regressions. However, since this difference reverses when we use our panel, it is hard to reach a conclusion. Similarly we have compared people who oppose and do not oppose admitting more refugees to Sweden. Here there are no clear differences between the groups. The results are available upon request. 
Notes:
The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity and disposable income inequality in each specification are from linear regressions on Trust which also includes a large set of control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the Table. The column denoted "Cross-Section" displays results based on the full pooled 1994 and 1998 samples, the column denoted "Panel Sample Without Fixed Effects" are results for the 1994−1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last column are results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for. For instance, Specification 1 and the column "Cross-Section" is a regression on Trust on Proportion Foreign, the county specific variables displayed in Table 2 , the individual specific variables displayed in Table 1 , plus time and county dummies. Specification 2 for the same column displays the results from the same regression but where Ethnic Heterogeneity is included instead of Proportion Foreign, and so forth. Standard errors allowing for clustering on counties are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity and disposable income inequality in each specification are from linear regressions on Trust which also includes a large set of control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the table. The columns denoted "Cross-Section" displays results based on the pooled 1994 and 1998 samples, the columns denoted "Panel Sample Without Fixed Effects" are results for the 1994−1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last two columns are results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for. Results with individual fixed effects are based on 117 and 223 individuals, respectively, observed in both 1994 and 1998 and living in the same county during these two years. Standard errors clustered on counties are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Causality
A serious concern in our investigation is the risk of reverse causality or simultaneity between income inequality and trust. In fact, one reason for the large interest in trust is that trusting societies appear to do well in almost any dimension. Several studies interpret such relationships as causal effects of trust. In line with this, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) warn us of the possibility that trusting communities may offer better opportunities for the poor. As an explanation they mention that risk sharing and informal credit transactions may be more common if people trust each other.
As a first tentative check of this, we estimate quantile income regressions where we include aggregate and individual trust as explanatory variables. The results, which are reported in Table B2 in Appendix B, do not indicate any problems of the kind mentioned above. Neither at the 10 th nor at the 90 th percentile do people have higher income in counties with higher average trust.
As a more thorough check of potential bias in our inequality estimates we next turn to two stage least squares where we treat inequality and mean income as endogenous variables.
Our empirical strategy is to take advantage of the fact that international demand for Swedish manufacturing goods in 1994 and 1998 affected counties differently depending on their industrial structure. International demand qualifies as an instrument as it is clearly exogenous and is not expected to have a direct effect on trust.
It is clear that international demand may affect individual disposable income through wages, employment, and potentially through changes in local taxes and welfare policies. It is also likely that these effects differ across individuals which in turn will alter the income distribution. For instance, if individuals with low levels of education, and thus with lower income, are overrepresented in export industries, increases in international demand will increase wages and employment the most among the low educated and thus reduce income inequality.
In order to capture the heterogeneous effects on income in the best possible way, in a first step we use our rich micro data from the LINDA-database (which we used to construct 
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The dependent variable in our first stage regression is constructed as
, , , , 10, , 16 We are grateful to Mikael Carlsson for providing these measures. Sweden's 13 main trading partners are Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, Denmark, USA, Canada, Japan, Norway, Finland and Austria; these countries absorb around 80 percent of Sweden's exports. 17 Note that even though , , j m t V is an approximation for domestic demand within county m -as it may also be affected by country m's exports -it is still exogenous for Swedish counties since these are too small to be able to induce a change in , , j m t V . Indeed, even the whole of Sweden is a small open economy, usually considered to have no effect on international trade in terms of quantities and prices. 18 Employment shares corresponding to SNI69 are only available up to 1992. We use shares for 1990 rather than for 1991 or 1992 as the deep economic crisis in Sweden during these years punctured domestic demand. Based on micro data from LINDA, the first stage regression is (5) , , ,
... ( 38 ) i t c i t c c t i t c c t i t c c t i t c c t c t
where the vector X contains a quartic in age, five education attainment dummies, dummies for kids, females, immigrants, cohabitants, and labor market status (in the same way as in our trust equations). 19 The vectors (5). However, suitable standard errors can be obtained through bootstrapping (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993 , for instance).
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To obtain bootstrapped standard errors we generate a new sample for equation (5) sample. This is a bootstrap-sample where some of the individuals may appear more than once and some may be absent. Based on the bootstrap-sample we re-construct our dependent variables according to equation (4), re-estimate the different versions of equation (5), and predict the inequality measures and mean income as described above. The resulting predictions together with our variables from the Election Studies make up a sample for our trust equations. We generate 200 samples this way, the suitable number of bootstrapreplications according to Efron and Tibshirani (1993) . For each of these 200 samples, we generate 200 new bootstrap-samples by randomly drawing with replacement. Estimating a trust equation on the resulting data produce 40,000 parameter estimates for each variable, from which the standard error of the regressors can be directly observed.
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Our sample for the first stage estimation, i.e. equation (5), invokes 310,443 individuals and 127 variables. Due to the large set of estimates, these results are available on request. An F-test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the variables for international demand are all equal to zero. R-squared for equation (5) is around 0.04. Table 5 contains the resulting estimates for our instrumented measures of income inequality and mean income together with the bootstrapped standard errors. The estimates of interest are very close to the OLS estimates in Table 3 . The coefficient of P50-10 is actually more negative in the 2SLS specification, although the level of statistical significance is about the same due to the larger bootstrapped standard error. The statistically insignificant P90-10 coefficient is remarkably close to its counterpart in Table 3 (and neither of them is statistically 20 Note that we do not use the log of income since we then would have to perform a non-linear transformation to obtain mean income which would cause our trust-estimates to be biased, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for instance. 21 Also see Knaap (2005) for a similar application. 22 As it turns out, bootstrapped standard errors for our instrumented variables are near 1.5 times the (invalid) OLS standard errors, indicating that the additional uncertainty introduced by equation (5) is reasonably small. We report only bootstrap-standard errors. significant), whereas the (positive) P90-50 coefficient is twice as large as in Table 3 , but still statistically insignificant since its standard error has increased by an even larger factor. Our conclusion is that the 2SLS estimates confirm our previous findings on the relationship between inequality and trust. 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
To sum up our empirical results, we find that P50-10 and Proportion Foreign display sizeable negative relationships with Trust. It is also worth noting that the point estimates of P90-50 are in contrast generally positive, but closer to zero and statistically insignificant. The widely used Gini coefficient is more weakly related to Trust. Its estimated effect on Trust is smaller than that of P50-10 and it is not statistically significant. Moreover, the effect of income inequality is primarily found among people with strong aversion against income differentials.
The choice of measures clearly appears to matter.
The finding that income inequality brings about a stronger reduction in trust among people who would like to see a more even distribution of income should not be discarded as self-evident. It could be especially relevant when comparing trust in different countries.
Compared with many other countries, Sweden has quite low economic inequality and an undeniably egalitarian political tradition. Thus Sweden's high level of trust could decline substantially should the lower half of the income distribution become more unequal. Compared with Sweden, only half as many people in the U.S. believe that most people can be trusted (Inglehart et al., 2004) . Given the lesser political saliency of income inequality in the U.S., it is not fully convincing to argue that the difference in trust is simply due to greater income inequality in this country.
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This "absolute" interpretation is however not the only possibility. By further studying other countries, and perhaps especially the U.S., we can figure out if behavioral differences between people of conflicting opinions are "absolute" and thus more pronounced in some countries, or more "relative" and thus prevalent in most or all countries. The answer is crucial when evaluating results from cross-country regressions, which have so far been relatively common in the trust literature, as well as when conducting studies on single countries.
In any case one should note that most of the 1970−1990 action in the U.S. wage distribution has occurred at the lower half (Katz and Autor, 1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004) . As shown by for instance Juhn et al. (1991) , males in the lower half of the wage distribution continuously received lower real wages in this period, whereas those in the upper half had about constant real wages. Thus, changes in the Gini have mostly been driven by changes in the lower half of the U.S. income distribution and this could explain Alesina and La Ferrara's (2002) finding that income inequality is negatively related to trust. At the same time their use of the Gini coefficient instead of the 50/10-quotient could explain why they get statistically insignificant results for this variable when they add racial heterogeneity to their model. Future research should use U.S. data to investigate if the 50/10-quotient outperforms the Gini coefficient in this regard.
We finally hope that our results will give rise to new and refined questions about the processes in which trust emerges. Much work remains to be done since the social mechanisms appear to be more involved than previous studies have been willing to assume. Not least the different responses to inequality in the bottom and top half of the income distribution should merit consideration in future studies. Table 3 . The reported results for measures of ethnic heterogeneity and disposable income inequality in each specification are from an ordered logit which includes a large set of control variables, as stated in the bottom section of the Table. The column denoted "Cross-Section" displays results based on the full pooled 1994 and 1998 samples, the column denoted "Panel Sample Without Fixed Effects" are results for the 1994−1998 panel without controls for individual fixed effects, and the last column are results for the panel sample when individual fixed effects are controlled for (as described in Appendix C). For instance, Specification 1 and the column "Cross-Section" is an ordered logit with Trust as dependent variable and the following explanatory variables: Proportion Foreign, the county specific variables displayed in Table 2 , the individual specific variables displayed in Table 1 , plus time and county dummies. Specification 2 for the same column displays the results from the same ordered logit but where Ethnic Heterogeneity is included instead of Proportion Foreign, and so forth. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Log of income is dependent variable. In order to correspond to the sample used for the inequality measures, only individuals aged 20−64 who are not students or old age pensioners are included. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 200 replications in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix A. Variable Specifications and Descriptive Statistics
Appendix B. Additional Empirical Specifications
